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Abstract. 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the transfer of ownership between the 
public and private sectors of Chinese industry, and its impacts on performance. We 
link ownership changes to productivity growth, and demonstrate that privatisation 
contributes significantly. We offer an extension that is generally ignored in the 
literature, in looking at firms that are taken back into state ownership, and evaluating 
the productivity growth effects of this. Further, we highlight the well-understood 
simultaneity problems, and demonstrate the hazard of ignoring the issue by comparing 
various estimators, including the modified control function approach. In general, the 
results stress the importance of allowing for such endogeneity when evaluating the 
productivity effects of ownership change. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of ownership changes for 
productivity growth. This work is based on analysis of firm level census data for 
China, including both Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and domestic private 
enterprises. China is of particular interest in the context of privatisation and 
performance for two reasons. Firstly, while much has been written on the impressive 
economic growth achieved in China, very little is known about the decompositions of 
this within firms and across sectors, beyond more general comparisons of 
organisational form. Secondly, China offers a particularly rich dataset in the context 
of privatisation, and the transfer of SOEs to the private sector (and in some cases the 
reverse) as well as the much-analysed foreign owned sector (see for example, Huang, 
2003). While there have been several studies of SOEs generally, see for example 
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), less is known about the performance of Chinese 
SOEs, largely due to data constraints. Equally, an issue that (as far as we are aware) 
all previous work in this area has ignored, is the issue of the reverse of this process, 
the number of firms that are transferred to SOE status from the private sector.  
We extend this literature by distinguishing between different forms of 
privatisation, the transfer of SOEs to private firms (private individual), PLCs (private 
company), cooperatives, and private firms with foreign investors. Table 1 
demonstrates, perhaps surprisingly that some private firms were converted to SOEs 
during the period. There have been some comments recently in the popular press that 
the Chinese government has recognised the potential of state ownership in 
contributing to performancei, though little is known about this process in China. 
Indeed the return of assets to state control is now so rare internationally that little 
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analysis is offered on this process. We therefore offer some analysis of which firms 
are taken into state hands, and their subsequent performance.   
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the relationship between 
privatisation and performance in general, and the previous work on ownership change 
and productivity growth. Section 3 offers a Chinese context to this debate, while 
section 4 presents some key aspects of our data. Section 5 discusses the modelling and 
econometric considerations, while the remaining sections present the results and 
discuss some conclusions.  
2. Privatisation and performance 
Much of the work on the productivity effects of privatisation is summarised in 
Megginson and Netter (2001) while Kirkpatrick and Parker (2005) and Boubraki et al 
(2005) offer an analysis of the impacts of privatisation in developing countries. Much 
of the recent work in this area is based on a study on US firms by McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995). This is based on ownership change in the context of acquisitions, and 
highlights the problems of selection bias in linking productivity growth to ownership 
change. Aivazain et al. (2005) discuss the selection problem in the context of Chinese 
SOEs, pointing out that in this context, the selection is performed, not by the market 
for corporate control, as would be the case for mergers or acquisitions in western 
countries, or even wholesale privatisation in eastern Europe for example, but through 
the government deciding which firms to privatise.  
The analysis of privatisation and productivity is based on the extended literature 
that has developed along similar lines to that which has sought to evaluate the post 
merger performance of firms, see for example Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987, 1990a, 
1990b), McGuckin and Nguyen (1995, 2001), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), 
and more recently Siegel et al. (2005).  
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The recent literature on productivity and ownership change is discussed in some 
detail by Harris et al. (2005) which derives Solow residual estimates of total factor 
productivity, and relates them to a particular form of ownership change, management 
buy outs. This type of work highlights two problems. Firstly, there exists a sample 
selection problem, in that there may be a latent relationship between the likelihood of 
a firm to change ownership and its potential for productivity growth. Secondly, there 
is an issue with how one measures total factor productivity, not only in allowing for 
endogeneity of inputs, but also other decisions that are taken by the firm that may 
impact on productivity. This will be discussed in more detail below.  
Recently, Brown et al. (2006) provide an update and extension of Earle and 
Telgedy (2002), demonstrating that productivity does indeed increase post 
privatisation, and argue that productivity gains have been achieved quickly. This is 
consistent with most empirical findings in this area, which associates privatisation 
with productivity growth. They also however highlight the importance of endogeneity 
in the productivity-ownership relationship, and the importance of not simply looking 
at privatisation per se, but the form that it takes. What is perhaps surprising is that in 
their estimates of productivity, Brown et al. (2006) do not allow for the potential 
endogeneity of capital, which is potentially important when considering ownership 
change and productivity.  
3. Ownership changes in China 
There is a good deal of casual analysis that has highlighted the very low levels of 
productivity in Chinese SOEs. There are broadly two explanations offered for this. 
The first is based on the standard problem of low incentives within public sector 
organisations, while the second highlights the important role that they play in 
contributing to wider social welfare. As a result of this, Megginson and Netter (2001) 
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just five years ago placed some doubt on the ability of the Chinese government to 
transfer its SOEs into the private sector because of this, based on the analysis of Lin 
(2000), Lin et al. (1998) and Bai et al. (1997). The conversion of Chinese SOEs to 
private sector companies has received much attention recently, see for example 
Avaizan et al. (2005) and Gupta (2005), who have commented on the importance of 
“partial privatisation”, that is the transfer of a non-controlling share of equity of SOEs 
to the private sector. Most authors suggest that this has had a significant productivity 
effect, see for example Wei et al. (2003) and Sun and Tong (2003). This is based on 
an earlier literature concerning the increasing use of incentives in SOEs, and their 
seemingly beneficial effects on productivity, see for example Shirley and Xu (1998). 
Much of this literature highlights the sample selection problems in identifying the 
specific effects of incentives, compared with wider sources of productivity growth. 
A special feature of the Chinese privatization is that it has never proceeded in a 
complete market liberalization or democratization (Sun and Tong, 2003). Sun and 
Tong (2003) review the history of China’s SOE reform during 1978-2000 in four 
stages. Using a sample of 634 listed SOEs on China’s two stock exchanges upon share 
issuing privatization (SIP) in the period of 1994-98, they find privatized SOEs 
through SIP have significantly improved earning and labour productivity. After SIP, 
state ownership has been found to negatively affect firm performance, while single 
person ownership appears to have positive impacts.  
Jefferson and Su (2006) also document the process of China’s ownership reform 
in four stages, including the first stage where a large number of new entries of non-
state firms during 1980s; the second stage where the reform of managerial control 
rights within SOEs was undertaken since mid-1980s; the third stage where there were 
lots of associations between formal ownership classification and ownership structure 
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of assets, which prepared in the fourth stage where the formal conversion of the 
ownership later on in mid-1990s. According to this, the ownership changes happen 
during 1999-2002 in our dataset are mainly through formal conversion stage.  
Song and Yao (2004) use survey data for 683 firms across 11 cities over the 
period of 1995-2001 to study the effects of privatization on profitability unit cost and 
labour productivity. Given that the Chinese SOEs have reduced employment in recent 
years, labour productivity measures may overstate the efficiency gain associated with 
ownership changes. Thus, while the approach of Song and Yao (2004) offers the 
advantage of more information on ownership holdings, it also suffers from the normal 
problems with self-administered surveys, concerning sample selection problems and 
approximations of certain key variables.  
Jefferson et al. (2000) demonstrate that the analysis of productivity in China is 
not simply a story of comparative productivity growth, privatisation, or even one of 
post privatisation performance. Rather, what is required is an analysis of the effects of 
different forms of ownership on productivity. Motohashi (2005) finds some evidence 
that new firms have higher productivity than older firms, but makes no comparison 
between forms of ownership. One weakness of previous work in this area is that it 
ignores the subtle distinctions in ownership and merely uses the public / private one. 
Rather, Chinese firms can be classified into state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
collectively owned enterprises (COEs), domestic private individual enterprises (PIEs), 
domestic private companies (PCOMs) and foreign-invested firms (FIEs) (foreign 
includes Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, as well as other foreign counties), the 
importance of which is highlighted by Brown et al. (2006). The definitions of these 
distinctions are provided in Appendix 1. Secondly, the transfer from SOE to private is 
not a one-way process, there are many examples of private and collective firms that 
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have, in recent years been transferred back into public ownership, and this is seldom 
commented on in the literature. This is clearly an important issue if one wishes to 
relate ownership (change) to productivity growth.  
We therefore seek to extend the literature on ownership and performance in 
China, by allowing for more sophisticated estimation of total factor productivity, 
controlling for potential endogenous ownership changes and selectivity bias, and also 
by a more elaborate firm ownership classification in our analysis.  
4. The modelling of privatisation and performance 
4.1 Predicting change of ownership 
The interaction between ownership change and productivity growth is well-
understood in the literature (see for example, Conyon et al., 2002; Harris and 
Robinson, 2002; Harris et al. 2005). As such therefore, in order to test for the 
endogeneity of ownership change, we propose an intermediate step in the analysis of 
privatisation and performance, determining the importance of productivity in 
explaining the probability of ownership change. Work on predicting ownership 
change has developed from McGuckin and Nguyen (1995). The prediction is based on 
a relatively standard probit model of ownership change, and is discussed in more 
detail in Conyon et al. (2004), Harris and Robinson (2002), and more recently in 
Svejnar et al. (2005).  In practice, the number of control variables that are used in 
these studies tends to be rather limited. In addition to firm size, various ownership and 
industry and regional characteristics, the variables employed in this literature tend to 
be confined to measures of firm performance, such as productivityii.   
We assume a firm faces a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive choices in 
changing its ownership form. Take the choices for a SOE as an example:  
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 remaining state owned 
 changing to COE 
 changing to private individually owned firm 
 changing to private company 
 becoming an FIE. 
In order to model this multiple discrete choice situation, we adopt a multinomial logit 
model (MNL). The covariates that are hypothesized to affect firm’s decision are 
firm’s characteristics, relevant resources and constraints, market condition, industry 
and regional dummies (for details of the variables and their definitions see Table 2). 
The coefficients are estimated by using method of maximum likelihood. A critical 
property of MNL is that the odds ratios of alternatives need to be independent of the 
remaining probabilities. Violating the IIA assumption leads to biased estimates, and 
one can test this assumption by Hausman and McFadden (1984).iii  
4.2 Impact of ownership change on productivity 
This section describes the empirical approach employed to examine the impact 
of ownership change on firms' total factor productivity. The basis of our empirical 
design is modelled as: 
),( iii OCXfTFP  ,  …. (1) 
where TFP is a measure of the TFP level or TFP growth of firm i, X is a vector of 
firm-specific determinants of performance, and OC captures the set of ownership 
changes, through a vector of dummy variables. X includes firm size, age, firms’ 
financial constraints, exports, innovation and labour quality. This extends previous 
work in this area that tends to focus merely on age and size, see for example Conyon 
et al. (2002) and Crisicuolo and Martin (2003). We also include exporting behaviour, 
as exporters are generally found to have higher levels of productivity (see Wagner 
(2005) for a review). The performance-enhancing effects of exporting in China are 
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also documented (Kraay, 1999). Innovation is widely found to be a key indicator of 
productivity growth (Jovanovic, 1982; Pakes and Ericson, 1998; Kremp and Mairesse, 
2004). Financing constraints are an important limitation on total factor productivity 
growth (Hansen, 1999), yet they are seldom considered in studies of productivity 
growth, largely one suspects due to data availability. In addition, labour quality 
indicator is included as a potential stimulus of productivity enhancement. Finally, we 
include a full set of industry and regional dummies. 
Our empirical analysis adopts the following strategy. As the panel is relatively 
short, we employ collapsed cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the 
average TFP (growth) over the period, and the initial values of other variables enter 
the regression as explanatory variables. This will sacrifice the time-variant 
information, but generates more reliable and robust results. In addition to the standard 
least square regression with robust standard errors, two alternative approaches are 
adopted to deal with firm heterogeneity: outlier robust regression (Rousseeuw and 
Leroy, 1987) and median regression (which is a special case of quantile regressions, 
Koenker and Bassett, 1978).  
As is discussed above, a further potential problem with much of the analysis in 
this area is that it is beset by endogeneity, simultaneity or the reverse causality 
problem. Further, one cannot simply assume a competitive market for corporate 
control in the context of Chinese SOEs in the way that most M&A studies do. We 
therefore start by testing for the potential endogeneity of productivity in ownership 
change by predicting ownership changes as discussed in section 4.1, and then to 
address the problem of multiple endogenous treatment variables with discreteness by 
applying Wooldridge’s (2005) modified control function (MCF) approach. MCF 
approach possesses an advantage of allowing for multiple treatments and various 
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distributional characteristics over the usual control function approach (Wooldridge, 
2002). The expected “correction functions” (named so to distinguish from usual 
control function) serve the purpose of instrumental variables, which is the correction 
for omitted variables bias and can be obtained through a set of standard probit reduced 
models of each binary variable, (which in our case the binary choice variables of 
ownership change). In form of: 
 iiiij ZXchangeOwner   '2'1'01_ , ZX ,| ~ Normal (0,1), ….(2) 
where X is a vector of exogenous covariates vector; Z is a vector of available 
instrumental variables, which are assumed to be exogenous and redundant in 
determining firm growth in the structural conditional expectation. To satisfy these 
assumptions, we construct Z using firms’ political affiliation indicators and business 
environmental variables. A significant proportion of Chinese firms are affiliated to 
some level of government for so-called supervisory purposes. As such, they are likely 
to be influenced by their supervisory agency, particularly in the context of ownership 
change. Equally, the supervisory relationship is also expected to affect the ability of 
firms to access finance. Political affiliation therefore includes a set of exclusive 
dummy variables capturing the level at which a firm is being supervised, such as 
central government or local government (province, prefecture, country, town, 
neighbour). The influence of political affiliations on firms’ behaviour is recognised in 
the literature, see for example Huang (2003) and Du and Girma (2007). Further, we 
employ SOE share and the Foreign share, which are defined as the share in terms of 
sales of the relevant group in each 3-digit industry and province. We also capture the 
“social welfare” nature of SOEs, through the SOE Loss Ratio, defined as the share of 
the loss-making SOEs in each industry and each province. The three instrumental 
variables that capture the market environment within a relatively homogeneous setting 
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which may be relevant in explaining a firm’s choice of ownership transfer. All 
instrumental variables are taken at their initial level to avoid possible endogeneity. 
This approach generates consistent, asymptotically normal estimation of the average 
treatment effects (Wooldridge, 2005). It also gives simple and straightforward 
specification test for the usual instrumental variable (IV) estimator.  
5.3 Total factor productivity estimation 
We construct a consistent firm-level measure of TFP following the 
methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The advantage of this method lies in 
controlling for the simultaneity between firm’s choice of input levels and unobserved 
productivity shocks by using firm’s intermediate inputs (such as raw materials or 
electricity) as proxies.  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i at time t  is: 
ititittitl
itititkitlit
mkl
kly




),(
0                 (3) 
where y is log of value added, which is sales net intermediate inputs (m), l is labour 
input and k is capital input, and  ),(),( 0 ititititkitittt mkkk    is an 
unknown function of capital and intermediate inputs. t is strictly increasing in the 
productivity shock it , so that it can be inverted and one can write ),( itittit km   
for some function t . Levinshon and Petrin (2003) approximate ),( ititt mk  by a third 
order polynomial in k and m, sit
j s
j
itjs mk

3
0
3   and obtain and estimate of l  and t  
(up to the intercept) via OLS. This constitutes the first stage of the estimation 
procedure. At the second stage the elasticity of capital k  is defined as the solution to 
 2*ˆmin
*  
i t
ititkitlit kly
k


, where it  is a nonparametric approximation 
 1| ititE  . Since the estimators involve two stages the calculations of the 
covariance matrix of the parameters must allow for the variation due to all of the 
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estimators in the two stages. Levinshon and Petrin (2003) note that the derivation of 
the analytical covariance matrix is quite involved, and suggest the bootstrapping 
procedure to estimate standard errors. In this study 250 bootstrap replications are 
performed. Once consistent estimates of the input elasticities are derived, the log of 
productivity can be obtained as itkitlitit kly  ˆˆˆ  . 
This literature on the TFP measurement is discussed in detail in Harris et al 
(2005), Doms and Jensen (1998), and Crisicuolo and Martin (2003), and in addition to 
the context of privatisation, in Boubakri et al (2005) and D’Souza et al (2005).  
5. Data 
This paper draws on the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprise Statistics 
compiled by the National Statistics Bureau (NSB) of China, which contains the 
population of medium and large SOEs and private enterprises with annual turnover 
more than 5 million RMB Yuaniv. This covers some 72% of the total assets and 57.6% 
of the national total industrial outputv. These firms are distributed across 30 two-digit 
manufacturing industries and 31 provinces (which are further grouped into 6 
geographical regions in the analysis).  
Table 1 demonstrates that for the period 1999-2002, 10% of Chinese SOEs were 
through one mechanism or another transferred to either collective enterprises, or 
private firms, or FIEs. This represents 7% of total assets and 9% of total output within 
the SOE sector, and 2.47% of total output of the Chinese manufacturing industry. At 
the same time, 2.85% of the private firms changed their ownership, accounting for 
2.2% total output and 1.7% total assets in the whole sample. Among these firms, 60% 
became collective firms, 1.76% became SOEs, and the rest changed from one form to 
another within the private ownership category. 
(Table 1 here) 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the relevant variables for overall 
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sample and by ownership. We capture firm characteristics by age, size, exporting 
activity and innovation activity, as well as wage rates. The average firm age is around 
14 years, while SOEs are relatively older (24 years), in contrast to PIEs (7 years), and 
PCOMs (10 years). SOEs are also bigger firms in terms of total employment with 433 
employees per firm on average, compared to 123 employees in PIEs, and 369 
employees in PCOMs.  
The data demonstrate significant variation in initial total factor productivity 
levels; this difference being particularly marked when comparing SOEs (0.09) and 
private firms (1.08-1.12), although a large standard deviation indicates a great 
heterogeneity within the each group. 15% of firms are exporters, made up of 11% of 
all SOEs and 18% of private firms. In terms of export intensity, private firms export 
between 9 and 13% of their output, while SOEs only export 5%. On average there are 
around 8% firms who undertake innovation activities, with the SOE group above 
average (10%) compared with only 3% of PIEs and 12% of PCOMs. Innovation 
intensity varies between 2% and 5% (defined as the new product sales over total 
sales). Firms’ finance constraints are captured by the ratio of firms’ domestic bank 
loans (measured by long-term liability over its total assets). Private firms are the most 
constrained financially.  
6. Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the multinomial logit estimation of the transfer of SOEs 
to other types of ownership. It is clear that the potential endogeneity problem does 
exist; in that existing TFP level is important in explaining the transfer of firms from 
the state to private sector. In general, it appears that it is the smaller SOEs that are 
privatised, with the exception being those become private firms, where the reverse is 
true. Younger firms also appear more likely to be privatised. These results all fit the 
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“stylised facts” regarding Chinese manufacturing firms that the largest SOEs tend to 
be the least productive ones, and potentially least attractive to private investors. The 
most common explanation for this is that SOEs are simply less efficient than other 
firms, though an alternative is that some SOEs are either in strategic industries, or 
have a social welfare role in generating employment in traditional sectors. The results 
also show some differences across the four types of privatisation. For example, 
financially constrained SOEs are more likely to be taken over by foreign investors; 
similarly, the more the foreign investment a SOE possesses, the more likely it 
converts to foreign ownership but the less likely it is to become a domestic private 
company. While ownership change does not seem to be linked with SOEs’ 
profitability, exporters are most likely to shift to foreign ownership, and firms with 
high levels of labour quality are less likely to become collectives or private individual 
firms. The non-state share in an industry and regional unit is positively associated 
with the likelihood of a SOE changing to private individual firms and domestic 
private companies. Neither of these results is surprising in itself, and both are 
consistent with similar studies for both developed and developing countries (Boubraki 
et al. 2005, D’Souza et al., 2005). They do however highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between types of private sector firm in privatisation, rather than simply 
treating all forms as the same.  
(Table 3 here) 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of the performance equation for 
the SOEs. The specification tests of MCF estimators justify the adoption of the 
method, which guides us to focus on the MCF results, while offering the alternatives 
for comparison. In general, younger firms have higher TFP, both in levels and growth, 
and the importance of this diminishes with age There is an interesting contrast 
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between the levels and growth effects in terms of firm size, with larger firms having 
lower levels of productivity, but also catching up vi . The endogeneity-corrected 
estimates produce different inferences for the effects of both age and size. For 
example, the relationship between firm size and productivity level (growth) becomes 
monotonically decreasing (increasing) according to MCF estimates. Thus ignoring the 
endogeneity may produce biased results. Firms with higher productivity levels 
experience slower productivity growth, while exporting and innovation are associated 
with higher TFP levels, but not TFP growth. Labour quality is also, not surprisingly 
an important determinant of both TFP level and growth. Financing constraints are 
found to have significant and negative effects on firm’s productivity level and growth, 
once one allows for the endogeneity of the privatisation decision the importance of 
financing constraints in productivity falls considerably. Again however this is true 
only for productivity levels, not growth. The apparent positive relationship between 
foreign investment and productivity growth disappears as the endogeneity is corrected, 
which may also reflect the self-selection issue. This is an important result in the 
context of the privatisation literature discussed above, as it diminishes the expected 
effects from foreign investments at firm level. Similar results emerge for exporting 
activity, as the coefficients of exporting dummy and intensity both lose their effects 
after one controls for the endogeneity. The positive impact of innovation however is 
consistent across the different estimators, indicating the importance of innovation in 
productivity growth. However, in general, the difference in the size of the point 
estimates across different estimators is marked.  
Overall changing ownership to non-state sector increases SOEs’ productivity 
and growth. The estimated coefficients of the ownership change dummies are 
generally smaller for the MCF estimator than the other estimators. This suggests that 
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if the endogeneity is not taken into account, then the effect of ownership change will 
be over stated.  
The results also suggest a definite “ordering” of the productivity-enhancing 
effects of the various forms of ownership change. Firms changing to FIEs tend to have 
the highest productivity level (22.5% marginal effect) and fastest growth (22.5% 
marginal effect), followed by firms changing to PIEs (20.7% and 19.1% marginal 
effect on TFP and TFP growth), and then PCOMs (17% and 17.6% marginal effect on 
TFP and TFP growth) and COEs (12.7% and 13.9% marginal effects on TFP and TFP 
growth). The results indicate that PIEs, PCOMs and FIEs are all associated with 
increased total factor productivity and total factor productivity growth. Perhaps a little 
surprisingly, so is collective ownership. These results in general are in line with the 
findings presented for a range of countries, particularly the importance of foreign 
investment. Interestingly, while ownership change associated with foreign investors 
displays remarkably robust productivity-enhancing effects across model specifications, 
increasing foreign investment share in SOE’s total finance only does not have 
significant effects, based on to the MCF estimates. This would appear to suggest that 
the appropriate corporate control rather than simply cashflow rights  is the key to 
improving  productivity.  
Finally a notable result here highlights the importance of access to bank loans 
in generating productivity growth. Those firms that can be characterised as financially 
constrained are associated with lower total factor productivity, and also lower total 
factor productivity growth.  
(Table 4 here) 
Turning now to the reverse case, in which firms moved from the private to the 
public sector. As reported in Table 5, the multinomial logit estimation that explains 
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the transfer of ownership to the public sector highlights some important contrast with 
the privatisation results. The first thing to note is that age now has the opposite effect 
from the privatised cases, in that older firms are more likely to be taken into public 
ownership. Again however there is a tendency for it to be the smaller firms that 
change ownership form, which is largely in line with the general M&A literature, and 
suggests the usual difficulties with changing ownership of very large firms. Exporting 
firms are less likely to move to public ownership, as are firms with existing foreign 
investors (though this effect is only marginally significant). The productivity effect 
dominates however, and is negative, suggesting that it is the less productive firms that 
are taken back into public ownership. It is a widely reported result that total factor 
productivity for publicly owned firms is below that of their private counterparts 
(Gonzalez-Paramo and Hernandez De Cos, 2005), and we, in line with previous work 
such as Jefferson et al. (2000), Jefferson and Su (2006) extend this argument by 
finding that it is the more productive firms tend to be those that are privatised. The 
results presented here extend this even further, and to the best of our knowledge is the 
first evidence that the firms move into public ownership in China are those with 
below average productivity. This contrasts with the recent anecdotal evidence for 
China discussed above. The most likely explanation of this is that such firms are taken 
into state ownership to protect their existence, possibly for long-term strategic 
reasons. The non-state share (within an industry and region) is negatively associated 
with the possibility of firm’s changing ownership, suggesting that the firms in the 
industry and region where the non-state share is higher are less likely to convert to 
state ownership. The coefficients of the regional dummies suggest that firms 
converted to SOEs are most likely to be in the central area, where large SOEs are 
concentrated. This contrasts with those converted to COEs and FIEs, and suggests that 
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ownership change may serve part of the State’s resource adjustment and re-allocation 
policies. 
(Table 5 here) 
Turning to the impacts of ownership change on productivity for private firms, 
the results across the various estimators are consistent, suggesting less importance of 
endogeneity of ownership change within the private sector than for SOEs. This is 
perhaps not surprising. The standard rationale, as discussed by Siegel et al. (2005) or 
Harris and Robinson (2002) for example, is the competitive nature of the market for 
corporate control. This leads to the assumption that firms with (potential of) high 
productivity growth are more likely the targets for takeovers than other firms. The 
same rationale may not apply in the reverse case however, where other considerations 
are more important. Focusing on the more reliable MCF estimates, they suggest that 
transferring to state ownership reduces a firm’s TFP (by 17.3%) and productivity 
growth (by 14.5%). By contrast, changing ownership to other forms does not have a 
statistically significant impact on productivity. Foreign investment has no significant 
effects on productivity (both in level and growth) within private sector companies, 
indeed the share of equity in private firms held by inward investors seems to be 
negatively associated with productivity levels.  Recalling the results based on the 
SOEs (in Table 4), this suggests that the share of foreign finance in a firm’s capital 
structure has little discernible effect on the productivity among Chinese firms. This 
however should be interpreted in a wider picture where foreign investments are likely 
to boost firms’ productivity through technology transfer and superior management 
ability, which would captured by the ownership change rather than the continued 
ownership. This ordering is consistent with the results presented in Table 6, outlining 
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the effects of change of ownership for privately owned firms. Finally, both labour 
quality and innovation are again strongly associated with firm performance.  
(Table 6 here) 
7. Conclusions  
This paper offers several contributions to the analysis of ownership change and 
productivity. Firstly, it has demonstrated the importance of allowing for endogeneity 
of productivity in ownership change, and how certain inferences can be sensitive to 
the treatment of endogeneity, particularly firm size, age and productivity. Secondly, 
the results confirm that privatisation in China is important for generating productivity 
growth. Thirdly, we find a degree of cherry picking by foreign investors when 
acquiring a stake of SOEs, but not when investing in private firms. Interestingly, 
foreign investors also have the effect of generating further productivity growth among 
hitherto SOEs. This highlights the second contribution of this paper, which is to 
distinguish between different types of ownership change in a manner that has, to the 
best of our knowledge not been done previously for China, and seldom at all. The 
results indicate that the transfer of SOEs to the private sector is important for 
productivity growth, and there is a consistent ranking of the productivity growth 
effects of privatisation. Changing to foreign ownership generates the greatest 
productivity-enhancing effect among SOEs, followed by the transfer to private 
individual enterprises, then to private company, and finally to collectively owned 
enterprises, which is still significant. Finally, our results question the wisdom of 
taking firms back into public ownership, as this appears to be associated with lower 
productivity, both in terms of level and growth.  
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Notes: 
                                                 
i China plans to profit from Marx, Jane MaCartney, The Times Jan 3, 2006, China: Battle for Oil and 
Money, Kremlin Style, Antoaneta Bezlova, Energy Bulletin October 2004; 
http://www.energybulletin.net/2927.html.  
ii There is an alternative strand in this literature based on Brous, and Kini, (1993) or  Matsusaka (1993) 
that evaluate merger decisions on the basis of “external calculations such as Q ratios, though that is 
clearly impractical for private individual firms or SOEs.  
iii See Greene (2005) chapter 21. 
iv RMB is China’s legal tender, and Yuan is the unit of RMB Its average exchange rate with USD is 
around 8.3:1 during 1999-2002.   
v The percentages are calculated at the mean level during the period 1999-2002, based on our data and 
the statistics reported in Chinese Statistical Yearbook (2003).  
vi According to the estimates in Table 5, the mean turning point of firm size is between 363-794 
persons. This means there are 10-20% firms that have reached this level in our sample. However this 
result does not hold in MCF estimation. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Ownership changes during 1999-2002 (mean over the period) 
To ==> No change 
Change to 
SOE 
Change to 
Collectives Change to private 
Change
FIEs
     To PIEs To PCOMs  
Change from below:       
SOE  45,596 / 987 865 2889 110
Private  79,774 405 1,435 / 503
 PIEs 51,664 30 741 / 1376 335
 PCOMs 24,589 375 694 2146 / 168
Note: The figures are calculated based on the database used in this paper. 
 
 Table 2 Descriptive Statistics  
Variables and Definitions Overall SOEs PIEs PCOMs 
 Mean Sta.dev Mean Sta.dev Mean Sta.dev Mean Sta.dev 
Explained variables (mean level)         
TFP growth 0.01 0.72 -0.03 0.75 0.06 0.69 0.02 0.72 
TFP level 0.73 1.18 0.09 1.29 1.12 0.84 1.08 1.18 
Explanatory variables (initial level)         
Age 13.42 15.39 23.57 17.51 5.69 5.98 10.07 13.71 
Size (total employment) 293 1218 433 1804 123 292 369 947 
Size (log of total employment) 4.50 1.60 4.51 1.98 4.27 1.13 4.91 1.55 
TFP level 0.72 1.24 0.11 1.38 1.09 0.90 1.07 1.13 
Normalized profit (total profit, normalized by average level by 
industry, province and ownership) 
0.99 64.70 0.86 95.71 0.72 22.40 1.77 49.72 
Export participation (export dummy) 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.39 
Exporting intensity (exports/total employment) 0.09 0.47 0.05 0.51 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.60 
Innovation participation (innovation dummy) 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.33 
Innovation intensity (New products sales/total sales) 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.18 
Labour quality (total wage and salary/total employment, 
normalized by average level by industry, province and 
ownership) 
0.98 2.37 0.97 2.96 0.96 1.39 1.05 2.70 
Financial constraints (Bank loans/total assets) 0.09 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.16 
Foreign investment/total external finance (%) 0.65 6.49 0.27 3.38 0.89 8.23 0.83 6.66 
Non-state share (share of non-SOEs within industry and region) 0.80 0.19 0.70 0.21 0.88 0.14 0.82 0.16 
Note: Data are deflated using industry-specific ex-factory price indices obtained from China Statistical Yearbook (2000-2003).
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Table 3: Determination of Ownership Change: SOEs 
Explained Variable: 
Choice of ownership 
change 
To COEs To PIEs To PCOMs TO FIEs 
Coeff.  
(Standard. err.) 
Coeff.  
(Standard. err.) 
Coeff.  
(Standard. err.) 
Coeff.  
(Standard. err.) 
Age -0.0118*** -0.0133*** -0.0128*** -0.0445*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0015) (0.0085) 
Age-squared 0.0000292 0.0000501*** 0.0000399*** 0.000111** 
 (0.000046) (0.000019) (0.000010) (0.000046) 
Size (log employment) 0.358*** 0.272*** 0.0626* 0.510** 
 (0.067) (0.071) (0.036) (0.23) 
Size-squared -0.0468*** -0.0334*** 0.0118*** -0.0433* 
 (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0039) (0.024) 
TFP level 0.376*** 0.255*** 0.358*** 0.283*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.018) (0.090) 
Financial constraints -0.133 -0.146 -0.0299 0.569** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.100) (0.24) 
Foreign investments -0.838 -0.176 -1.646** 5.445*** 
 (1.24) (1.14) (0.70) (0.48) 
Profitability -0.0000735 -0.0000362 -0.0000701 0.000151 
 (0.00028) (0.00036) (0.00014) (0.0011) 
Exporting participation -0.0372 -0.0370 0.292*** 1.298*** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.061) (0.25) 
Exporting intensity -0.00419 -0.0264 -0.0235 0.0357 
 (0.060) (0.097) (0.050) (0.049) 
Labour quality -0.106*** -0.156*** 0.00187 -0.0273 
 (0.036) (0.046) (0.0054) (0.055) 
Non-state share 0.0336 0.413** 0.580*** 0.701 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.11) (0.64) 
Central area -0.423*** 0.272*** -0.193*** -0.0665 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.051) (0.25) 
West area -0.248** -0.0567 0.242*** -0.864** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.056) (0.41) 
Constant -3.932*** -4.161*** -3.467*** -7.408*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.13) (0.80) 
Observations 43232 
Hausman test of IIA: H0: Odds are independent of other alternatives 
Chi_squared (df) -4.944 (65) -8.950(64) -29.094(64) -1.118(59) 
Note 1: Multinomial logit model for ownership changes (Choice set: 0: no change (base group); 2: change to COEs; 2: 
change to PIEs; 3: change to PCOMs; 4. change to FIEs). The reported Hausman tests for IIA validate the application of 
multinomial tests by confirming the independence of alternatives.   
Note 2: All estimations involve industry dummy. 
Note 3: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Impacts of Ownership Change on TFP (and Growth): SOEs 
Explained variable TFP Level TFP Growth
Estimation method Robust-OLS Outlier Median MCF Robust-OLS Outlier Median MCF Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff. (se.) Coeff.(se..) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) 
Age -0.014*** 
(0.001)
-0.019*** 
(0.000)
-0.015 
(0.000)***
0.002 
(0.001)*** 
-0.005*** 
(0.000)
-0.004*** 
(0.000)
-0.003*** 
(0.000)
-0.007*** 
(0.001)
Age-squared 0.00008*** (0.003)
0.00026*** 
(0.001)
0.00014 
(0.001)***
0.00009 
(0.002)*** 
0.00004*** 
(0.001)
0.00003*** 
(0.000)
0.00003*** 
(0.000)
0.00013*** 
(0.002)
Size (employment) -0.394*** (0.010)
-0.369*** 
(0.009)
-0.342 
(0.010)***
-0.048 
(0.009)*** 
0.015** 
(0.007)
0.037*** 
(0.004)
0.042*** 
(0.004)
0.012 
(0.008)
Size-squared 0.118*** (0.002)
0.117*** 
(0.002)
0.116 
(0.002)***
-0.045 
(0.003)*** 
0.011*** 
(0.002)
0.006*** 
(0.001)
0.005*** 
(0.001)
0.012*** 
(0.002)
TFP level / / / / -0.213*** (0.005)
-0.150*** 
(0.002)
-0.145*** 
(0.002)
-0.220*** 
(0.007)
Finance constraints (Bank loans/total assets) -0.471*** (0.030)
-0.427*** 
(0.023)
-0.432*** 
(0.027)
-0.200*** 
(0.018) 
-0.069*** 
(0.020)
-0.031*** 
(0.012)
-0.041*** 
(0.011)
-0.062*** 
(0.022)
Foreign investment in total external finance 0.732** (0.292)
0.751*** 
(0.213)
0.851*** 
(0.237)
-0.280 
(0.291) 
0.197 
(0.211)
0.246 
(0.155)
0.051 
(0.147)
0.167  
(0.240)
Exporting participation (dummy) 0.243*** (0.020)
0.167*** 
(0.018)
0.187*** 
(0.021)
0.004 
(0.015) 
0.011 
(0.013)
0.005 
(0.009)
0.011 
(0.008)
0.008  
(0.015)
Exporting intensity (exports/total sales) 0.011 (0.008)
0.018* 
(0.010)
0.013 
(0.010)
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.009)
-0.007 
(0.004)
0.001 
(0.004)
-0.002  
(0.018)
Innovation participation (dummy) 0.226*** (0.026)
0.143*** 
(0.024)
0.145*** 
(0.028)
0.087*** 
(0.022) 
0.020 
(0.016)
0.017 
(0.011)
0.005 
(0.011)
0.020 
(0.016)
Innovating intensity (exports/total sales) 0.245*** (0.065)
0.275*** 
(0.053)
0.358*** 
(0.063)
0.120** 
(0.050) 
0.065* 
(0.037)
0.033 
(0.025)
0.047* 
(0.024)
0.061  
(0.038)
labour quality 0.045*** (0.006)
0.325*** 
(0.002)
0.147*** 
(0.002)
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.002)
0.004*** 
(0.001)
0.004*** 
(0.001)
0.008*** 
(0.002)
Ownership change to collectives 0.514*** (0.032)
0.485*** 
(0.033)
0.469*** 
(0.039)
0.127*** 
(0.023) 
0.151*** 
(0.018)
0.105*** 
(0.015)
0.094*** 
(0.014)
0.139*** 
(0.017)
Ownership change to private individual 0.422*** (0.031)
0.426*** 
(0.036)
0.458*** 
(0.042)
0.207*** 
(0.018) 
0.172*** 
(0.023)
0.129*** 
(0.016)
0.110*** 
(0.015)
0.191*** 
(0.018)
Ownership change to private company 0.508*** (0.019)
0.467*** 
(0.020)
0.485*** 
(0.024)
0.170*** 
(0.015) 
0.163*** 
(0.013)
0.100*** 
(0.009)
0.089*** 
(0.009)
0.176*** 
(0.015)
Ownership change to foreign-owned firms 0.469*** (0.112)
0.397 
(0.100)***
0.415*** 
(0.117)
0.255** 
(0.105) 
0.219** 
(0.087)
0.124*** 
(0.045)
0.123*** 
(0.043)
0.225 
(0.085)***
Regional dummy: central area -0.070*** (0.013)
-0.154*** 
(0.012)
-0.146*** 
(0.014)
0.725*** 
(0.012) 
-0.023*** 
(0.009)
-0.028*** 
(0.006)
-0.037*** 
(0.005)
0.002 
(0.012)
Regional dummy: west area -0.233*** (0.014)
-0.309*** 
(0.013)
-0.299*** 
(0.016)
-0.256*** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.010)
-0.021*** 
(0.007)
-0.026*** 
(0.006)
0.003 
(0.009)
Constant 0.734*** (0.029)
0.458*** 
(0.024)
0.456*** 
(0.028)
-1.323*** 
(0.023) 
-0.167*** 
(0.019)
-0.188*** 
(0.012)
-0.193*** 
(0.011)
-0.154*** 
(0.021)
Observations 42917 42916 42917 42578 34097 34097 34097 33839 
Note 1: Wooldridge’s (2005) MCF method involves correction function (CF) for potential endogenous variables, i.e. ownership change binary choice variables in this paper; 
and interaction terms of the correction functions with the differences of exogenous covariates and their means. The correction functions are defined through proposed 
mechanism, specifically the normal density of the predicted probabilities obtained through Probit models. The significance of the correct function itself vindicates the 
appropriate application of this approach. We leave the lengthy details out from the table above, which are available under requests.  
Note 2: All estimations involve industry dummy; Note 3: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Determination of Ownership Changes: Private Firms 
Explained Variable: 
Choice of ownership 
change 
To SOEs To COEs TO FIEs 
Coeff.  
(Standard. err.) 
Coeff.  
(Standard. err.) 
Coeff.  
(Standard. err.) 
Age 0.0423*** 0.0853*** -0.0217 
 (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.014) 
Age-squared -0.000413** -0.00181*** -0.0000777 
 (0.00017) (0.00022) (0.00033) 
Size (log employment) -0.640*** -0.0147 0.0216 
 (0.10) (0.068) (0.14) 
Size-squared 0.104*** -0.00229 0.0180 
 (0.010) (0.0082) (0.014) 
TFP level -0.282*** 0.156*** 0.0506 
 (0.045) (0.030) (0.052) 
Financial constraints 0.513* 0.689*** 0.230 
 (0.26) (0.14) (0.35) 
Foreign investments -5.309* 0.0353 4.195*** 
 (2.91) (0.41) (0.14) 
Profitability -0.000880* -0.000620 0.000610 
 (0.00053) (0.00067) (0.0011) 
Exporting participation 0.336* -0.0432 1.190*** 
 (0.19) (0.088) (0.10) 
Exporting intensity -0.723** 0.0233 0.0572** 
 (0.34) (0.068) (0.025) 
Labour quality 0.0137 -0.00147 0.0180*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.0068) 
Non-state share -2.451*** -1.946*** -0.958** 
 (0.28) (0.17) (0.39) 
Central area 0.374*** -0.265*** -0.422*** 
 (0.13) (0.076) (0.16) 
West area 0.0428 -0.661*** -0.858*** 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.25) 
Constant -2.540*** -2.929*** -5.107*** 
 (0.37) (0.23) (0.50) 
Observations 78762 
Hausman test of IIA: H0: Odds are independent of other alternatives 
Chi_squared (df) -0.0264 (44) -0.9741(44) -0.713(40) 
Note 1: Multinomial logit model for ownership changes (Choice set: 0: no change (base group); 
1. change to SOEs; 2: change to COEs; 4. change to FIEs). The reported Hausman tests for IIA 
validate the application of multinomial tests by confirming the independence of alternatives. 
Note 2: All estimations involve industry dummy. 
Note 3: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Impacts of Ownership Change on TFP (and Growth): Private Firms 
Explained variable TFP Level TFP growth
Estimation method Robust-OLS Outlier Robust Median MCF Robust-OLS Outlier Robust Median MCF 
 Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) Coeff.(se.) 
Age -0.009*** 
(0.000)
-0.008*** 
(0.000)
-0.008*** 
(0.000)
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001)
-0.005*** 
(0.000)
-0.005*** 
(0.000)
-0.008*** 
(0.001)
Age-squared 0.00007*** 
(0.001)
0.00007*** 
(0.001)
0.00007*** 
(0.001)
0.00033*** 
(0.004) 
0.00011*** 
(0.002)
0.00007*** 
(0.002)
0.00006*** 
(0.001)
0.00016*** 
(0.003)
Size (employment) -0.339*** 
(0.010)
-0.335*** 
(0.008)
-0.379*** 
(0.008)
-0.459*** 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.008)
0.048*** 
(0.005)
0.040*** 
(0.005)
-0.039*** 
(0.009)
Size-squared 0.089*** 
(0.002)
0.093*** 
(0.002)
0.104*** 
(0.002)
0.132*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002)
-0.001 
(0.001)
0.001 
(0.001)
0.023*** 
(0.002)
TFP level / / / / -0.321*** (0.005)
-0.226*** 
(0.002)
-0.224*** 
(0.002)
-0.335*** 
(0.005)
Finance constraints (Bank loans/total assets) -0.413*** 
(0.026)
-0.376*** 
(0.020)
-0.364*** 
(0.022)
-0.478*** 
(0.025) 
-0.118*** 
(0.020)
-0.060*** 
(0.014)
-0.072*** 
(0.014)
-0.103*** 
(0.022)
Foreign investment in total external finance -0.073 
(0.092)
-0.022 
(0.063)
0.044 
(0.069)
-0.678*** 
(0.169) 
0.085 
(0.109)
0.034 
(0.049)
0.078 
(0.050)
-0.054 
(0.125)
Exporting participation (dummy) 0.037*** 
(0.009)
0.014 
(0.009)
-0.008 
(0.009)
0.025 
(0.016) 
-0.043*** 
(0.012)
0.005 
(0.008)
-0.005 
(0.006)
-0.047* 
(0.024)
Exporting intensity (exports/total sales) -0.000 
(0.007)
0.001 
(0.008)
-0.002 
(0.005)
-0.028 
(0.019) 
0.062*** 
(0.016)
-0.034*** 
(0.010)
-0.011** 
(0.005)
0.062+ 
(0.037)
Innovation participation (dummy) 0.063*** 
(0.022)
0.029 
(0.018)
0.015 
(0.020)
0.178*** 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.016)
-0.010 
(0.012)
-0.010 
(0.013)
0.022 
(0.014)
Innovating intensity (exports/total sales) 0.147*** 
(0.040)
0.154*** 
(0.031)
0.209*** 
(0.035)
0.084* 
(0.035) 
0.111*** 
(0.031)
0.100*** 
(0.022)
0.092*** 
(0.022)
0.097*** 
(0.031)
labour quality 0.048*** 
(0.010)
0.178*** 
(0.002)
0.140*** 
(0.001)
0.084*** 
(0.008) 
0.006*** 
(0.001)
0.003*** 
(0.001)
0.002* 
(0.001)
0.009*** 
(0.003)
Ownership change to SOEs -0.385*** 
(0.055)
-0.353*** 
(0.040)
-0.318*** 
(0.045)
-0.173*** 
(0.064) 
-0.164*** 
(0.031)
-0.097*** 
(0.024)
-0.076*** 
(0.024)
-0.145*** 
(0.042)
Ownership change to collectives 0.121*** 
(0.021)
0.090*** 
(0.021)
0.060** 
(0.024)
-0.004 
(0.020) 
-0.010 
(0.014)
-0.014 
(0.012)
-0.017 
(0.013)
-0.017 
(0.018)
Ownership change to foreign-owned firms 0.091** 
(0.037)
0.051 
(0.036)
0.046 
(0.040)
0.024 
(0.040) 
0.034 
(0.026)
0.031 
(0.021)
0.020 
(0.021)
0.019 
(0.023)
Regional dummy: central area -0.137*** 
(0.009)
-0.130*** 
(0.008)
-0.098*** 
(0.008)
-0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.027*** 
(0.008)
-0.015*** 
(0.005)
-0.019*** 
(0.006)
-0.016 
(0.010)
Regional dummy: west area -0.200*** 
(0.011)
-0.226*** 
(0.010)
-0.194*** 
(0.011)
-0.080*** 
(0.013) 
-0.033*** 
(0.010)
-0.044*** 
(0.007)
-0.041*** 
(0.007)
-0.020** 
(0.010)
Constant 1.587*** 
(0.028)
1.445*** 
(0.019)
1.764*** 
(0.021)
1.615*** 
(0.025) 
0.293*** 
(0.023)
0.123*** 
(0.013)
0.137*** 
(0.014)
0.455*** 
(0.032)
Observations 78958 78957 78958 78697 48363 48362 48363 48052 
Note 1: Wooldridge’s (2005) MCF method involves correction function (CF) for potential endogenous variables, i.e. ownership change binary choice variables in this paper; 
and interaction terms of the correction functions with the differences of exogenous covariates and their means. The correction functions are defined through proposed 
mechanism, specifically the normal density of the predicted probabilities obtained through Probit models. The significance of the correct function itself vindicates the 
appropriate application of this approach. We leave the lengthy details out from the table above, which are available under requests.  
Note 2: All estimations involve industry dummy; Note 3: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 1: The Classification and Definition of Different Types of Chinese Firms 
Following the classification convention of Chinese National Statistics Bureau, and “The 
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the Management of Registration 
of Corporate Enterprises.” (short for “Regulation”), as well as previous literature, we 
classify the firms into the state-owned enterprises, collectively owned enterprises, 
domestic private individual enterprises, domestic share-holding companies and limited 
companies, and foreign invested firms. It is noteworthy that the few work has made 
advances on a reasonable classification beyond the traditional breakdown, which is an 
attempt we are making here. The details are following.   
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
This group mainly includes registered SOEs according to the Regulation. They are non-
corporation economic units where the entire assets are owned by the state. The state 
government therefore assigns managers to run the enterprise; and state banks (used to be 
government agent and now still under government control) construct and enforce the 
credit plans. Differentiated from state-owned enterprise in national registration system, 
three other types are also included in this group, which are joint state-owned enterprises 
that are established by two or more state-owned enterprises through joint investment on 
the basis of equality, voluntary participation, and mutual benefits; joint state and 
collectively owned enterprises that are established by two or more state-owned 
enterprises and collectively owned enterprises with similar principles; finally limited 
liability corporations solely funded by the state. The above-mentioned four types 
comprise respectively 93.7%, 1.1%, 2.6%, and 2.6% of the SOEs group.  
Collectively owned enterprise (COEs) 
COEs are the economic units such that the assets are owned by collectives. The 
collective here means the community in the city or rural area. COEs are normally under 
local governments’ supervision. However, since local government can be considered as 
the agent of central government, any firm owned by local government is also owned by 
central government. Apart from registered COEs according to the Regulation, this group 
also includes joint collectively owned enterprises, cooperative enterprises, and other 
joint ownership enterprises. Meanwhile, township-village enterprises (TVEs) are 
included in this group that locate in rural areas and collectively owned or with most of 
its investment from residents in these rural areas. TVEs are not distinguished from other 
COEs in this paper.  
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Domestic private individual enterprises (PIEs) 
Domestic private individual enterprises include four types of private firms, solely 
private funded enterprises, private cooperative enterprises, private limited liability 
corporations, and private share-holding corporation limited. These economic units are 
all registered as private individual enterprises according to the Regulation. Generally 
speaking, this type of firms are normally smaller and younger, possibly start with family 
business or group of individual investors, and are run in a relatively more flexible form, 
compared with PCOMs below. 
Domestic private companies (PCOMs) 
Domestic private companies include the rest of the private enterprises, mainly share-
holding corporation limited and other limited companies. These economic units are all 
registered as private individual enterprises according to the Regulation. Share-holding 
companies limited are economic units registered in accordance with the Regulation, 
with total registered capital divided into equal shares and raised through issuing stocks. 
Each investor bears limited liability to the company depending to the holding of shares, 
and the corporation bears liability to its debt to the maximum of its total assets. 
Generally speaking, this type of companies are normally bigger than private individual 
enterprises, and in a relatively more mature stage of company development, also more 
strictly subject to regulations. 
Foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) 
Foreign-invested firms refer to the enterprises invested by foreign investments, and 
foreign investments must be more than 25% of registered assets according to the 
Regulation. This group includes FIEs with investments both from Hong Kong, Tai Wan 
and Macau and foreign countries.  
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Table A1. The classification of ownership 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
State owned enterprises (Guo you qi ye) 
Joint state-owned enterprises (Guo you lian ying qi ye) 
Joint state and collective-owned enterprises (Guo you yu ji ti lian ying qi ye) 
Limited liability corporations which are solely funded by the state (Guo you du zi gong si) 
Collectively owned enterprises (COEs) 
Collectively owned enterprises (Ji ti qi ye) 
Joint collectively owned enterprises (Ji ti lian ying qi ye) 
Cooperative enterprises (Gu fen he zuo qi ye) 
Other joint ownership enterprises (Qi ta lian ying qi ye) 
Private individual enterprises (PIEs) 
Solely private funded enterprises (Si ying du zi qi ye) 
Private cooperative enterprises (Si ying he huo qi ye) 
Private limited liability corporations (Si ying you xian ze ren gong si) 
Private share-holding corporations limited (Si ying gu fen you xian gong si) 
Private companies (PCOMs) 
Other Limited liability corporations (Qi ta you xian ze ren gong si) 
Share holding companies (Gu fen you xian dong si) 
Foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) 
FIEs – invested by Hong Kong, Macau, and Tai Wan 
FIEs - invested by foreign owned firms 
Note: Chinese translations in parentheses. 
 
